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Abstract
In 2012, China revised its Criminal Procedure Law (2012
CPL). One of the major changes is its official approval of the
use of victim-offender reconciliation, or ‘criminal reconcilia-
tion’ in certain public prosecution cases. This change, on the
one hand, echoes the Confucian doctrine that favours har-
monious inter-personal relationships and mediation, while,
on the other hand, it deviates from the direction of legal
reforms dating from the 1970s through the late 1990s.
Questions have emerged concerning not only the cause of
this change in legal norms but also the proper position of
criminal reconciliation in the current criminal justice system
in China. The answers to these questions largely rely on
understanding the role of traditional informal dispute resolu-
tion as well as its interaction with legal norms. Criminal rec-
onciliation in ancient China functioned as a means to cen-
tralise imperial power by decentralizing decentralising its
administration. Abolishing or enabling such a mechanism in
law is merely a small part of the government’s strategy to
react to political or social crises and to maintain social stabili-
ty. However, its actual effect depends on the vitality of
Confucianism, which in turn relies on the economic founda-
tion and corresponding structure of society.
Keywords: Criminal reconciliation, Confucianism, decentrali-
sation, centralisation
1 Introduction
Scholarship on the relationship between legal norms and
social norms is flourishing. Over the past few decades, a
number of publications have appeared on diverse
* Wei Pei, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the Beihang School of Law
in the Beihang University.
topics.1 This article intends to contribute to this schol-
arly debate by exploring the interaction between legal
and social norms in the topic of criminal reconciliation
in China.
Why criminal reconciliation? One widespread view
holds that the maintenance of harmonious relationships
between disputants by way of private mediation, even in
the criminal context, has long been prized by traditional
Chinese culture.2 Such a cultural foundation should
(and did in ancient times) encourage the legislator to
codify mediation in written law. However, since the end
of the Qing Dynasty in the early 1900s, modernisation
of the Chinese criminal justice system has resulted in
the reduction of private dispute resolution proceedings
(particularly mediation), on the one hand, and the rise of
formal criminal proceedings featuring public confronta-
tion, on the other.
Does this trend in legal norms indicate a gradual weak-
ening in the influence of traditional mediation in solving
criminal cases? This question is difficult to answer,
especially when one takes the 2012 Criminal Procedure
Law (2012 CPL) into consideration. After the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976), three versions of the CPL have
been enacted. Both the 1979 CPL and its 1996 revision
1. M. Edwards, ‘The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy’, 26 Berkley
Journal of Employment and Labor Law 41 (2005) (civil and commercial
law); E. Scott, ‘Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage’, 86
Virginia Law Review 1902 (2000) (marriage law); E. Posner, ‘Law and
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance’, 86 Virginia Law Review
1781 (2000) (tax law); M. Eisenberg, ‘Corporate Law and Social
Norms’, 99 Columbia Law Review 1253 (1999) (corporate law); R.
Cooter, ‘Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis’, 60
Law & Contemporary Problems 73 (1997) (punitive damages); D.
Kahan, ‘What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?’, 73 The University Chi-
cago Law Review 1 (1996) (criminal sanction); L. Bernstein, ‘Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms’, 144 University Pennsylvania. Law Review 1765
(1996) (contract and commercial law); R. Ellickson, Order without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) (about civil dispute resolution).
2. See e.g. X. Zeng, ‘Mediation in China – Past and Present’, 17 Asia
Pacific Law Review 1 (2009) (about the historical roots of mediation);
G. Chen, Law without Lawyers, Justice without Courts: On Traditional
Chinese Mediation (2002) (about the cultural roots of mediation and its
litigation-averse nature); P. Huang, ‘Between Informal Mediation and
Formal Adjudication’, 19 Modern China 251 (1993) (about medication
in civil justice in Qing Dynasty); E. Glassman, ‘The Function of Media-
tion in China: Examining the Impact of Regulations Governing the Peo-
ple’s Mediation Committees’, 10 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 460
(1991) (about the semi-official mediation institution PMC); S. Lubman,
Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist
China (1967) (about the political function of mediation during Mao’s
period); J. Cohen, ‘Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization’, 54
California Law Review 1201, at 1201 (1966) (about the coordination
between traditional mediation and Mao’s communism).
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seemed to follow the trend of marginalising forms of
private dispute resolution. However, in the 2012 revi-
sion, victim-offender mediation is recognised as a spe-
cial procedure to solve two categories of public prosecu-
tion cases.3 The first category refers to cases caused by
disputes between civilians, falling into crimes stipulated
in Chapters 4 and 5 of the 1997 Criminal Law (1997
CL), and with a maximum sentence lower than three
years’ imprisonment. The second category includes
negligent crimes with a maximum sentence lower than
seven years’ imprisonment, except for duty-related
crimes.4
Thus, the following questions emerge. Why has the leg-
islator’s attitude towards criminal reconciliation been
more favourable in certain time periods than others?
Can similar changes in social preferences regarding pri-
vate dispute resolution be observed? If not, how can the
divergence and convergence between social norms and
law be explained? More importantly, what should be the
proper position of criminal reconciliation in the current
criminal justice system in China? All in all, why has
criminal reconciliation come back and how does it come
back? Answers to these questions largely rely on under-
standing the evolution of social norms as well as their
interaction with legal norms. This article follows Feel-
ey’s (1976) definition to a large degree. Feeley describes
a legal norm as ‘a command or order [issued by compe-
tent state authority and properly published] to do or
refrain from doing some specified act(s), and is …
[enforceable] by the threat of physical coercion attached
3. China still preserves private prosecution in certain situations. According
to the 2012 CPL, private prosecution can be applied to three situations
under the 1997 CL: (1) cases to be handled only upon individual com-
plaint, including insult and slander (Art. 246), violent interference with
the freedom of marriage (Art. 257), abuse (Art. 260) and normal
embezzlement (Art. 270); (2) minor criminal cases that the victims must
have evidence to prove, including eight kinds of crimes under 1997 CL:
intentional injury (para. 1, Art. 234), intrusion (Art. 245), infringing the
right of communication (Art. 252), bigamy (Art. 258), abandonment
(Art. 261), infringement of intellectual property rights (Section 1 in
Chapter 3), manufacturing and selling fake and shoddy goods (Section
1 in Chapter 3) and crimes within Chapters 4 and 5 for which a sen-
tence of less than three years’ imprisonment may be imposed; and (3)
cases for which the victims have evidence to prove that the defendants,
who infringed the victim’s personal or property rights, should be investi-
gated, whereas the PSO or the public procuratorate refuses to investi-
gate. The purpose of the third type of case, which is distinguished from
the former two, is to provide remedy to the victims when the state
machinery fails to function, and its nature is a limitation on judicial dis-
cretion. Thus, only in the former two types may parties have their cases
reconciled either by victims withdrawing prosecution, or by the people’s
court recognising the reconciliation agreement. Private prosecution
cases only account for a very small proportion of the entire criminal
caseload.
4. For detailed introduction of the legal regime of criminal reconciliation
under the 2012 CPL, see W. Pei, ‘Criminal Reconciliation in China: Con-
sequentialism in History, Legislation, and Practice’, 3 China-EU Law
Journal 191 (2014). Some scholars have also discussed the application
of criminal reconciliation in death penalty, but it is mainly based on
practice before the 2012 CPL. The 2012 CPL prescribes the scope of
reconcilable cases, and this article relies on that scope. See R. Weather-
ley and H. Pittam, ‘Money for Life: The Legal Debate in China About
Criminal Reconciliation in Death Penalty Cases’, 39 Asian Perspective
277 (2015).
to the order’.5 ‘Social norms’, in contrast, are ‘informal
societal constraints that are generally not enforceable
under law’.6 Two major distinctions between legal
norms and social norms are the pro forma distinction
with respect to legislative procedure and legal forms and
the substantial distinction regarding enforceability. In
this article, ‘legal norm’ is interchangeable with ‘law’,
while ‘social norm’ generally equals social morals,
among which the Confucianism doctrines are in domi-
nance in China.
From a historical perspective, however, this distinction
is not necessarily a black-and-white one. In ancient Chi-
na, social order was maintained by clans at the local level
and by the state government at the central level through
a number of laws and moral codes.7 Confucian doctrines
played out not only ‘in the ritual practice of the people,
in the everyday life of the family, [and] in the moral
education of peasants and elite alike’ but also ‘in the
administration of the state’.8 This study focuses on the
period following the late Qing Dynasty as it was in that
period that the state and its legal system started the pro-
cess of modernisation, and the current legal regime
came into being. Because of modernisation, legal norms
and social norms have been gradually separated not only
in form but also in enforceability.
A few notes about the subject of both social and legal
norms in this study are necessary. This article focuses
on criminal reconciliation, a form of alternative dispute
resolution in the field of criminal justice. It refers to a
mechanism used during the administration of criminal
justice that permits offenders and victims to reach a
mutual understanding of a criminal act and its conse-
quences through direct or indirect communication. It
also permits parties to settle their civil disputes by
means of apology, compensation and so on. Private set-
tlement will not necessarily terminate criminal litiga-
tion, but it will act as a mitigating factor in judicial deci-
sions. Given that the people’s procuratorates (人民
检察院, China’s Public Prosecution Service) follow the
principle of legality (or mandatory prosecution) instead
of the principle of expediency in the current legal sys-
tem, the most common situation is that offender-victim
reconciliation acts as a mitigating factor in judges’ deci-
sions.
Different terms have been used for this type of dispute
resolution. Compared with ‘mediation’ (调解), ‘criminal
reconciliation’ (刑事和解) is a relatively new concept.
From a linguistic perspective, ‘mediation’ and ‘reconci-
liation’ are slightly different. ‘Mediation’ emphasises the
procedure used to reach an agreeable solution, especially
the use of a ‘neutral third party’, while ‘reconciliation’
focuses on the consequences of ‘the restoration of har-
5. M. Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes
on an Expanded View’, 10 Law & Society, 497, at 498 (1976).
6. M. West, ‘Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World of
Sumo’, 26 The Journal of Legal Studies 165, at 167 (1997).
7. See Max Weber’s analysis on the self-governance of villagers in ancient
China in M. Weber, The Religion of China, translated and edited by
H.H. Gerth (1951).
8. D. Gardner, Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction (2014), at 87.
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mony’ between parties in conflict.9 Despite this, the
essence of mediation and reconciliation – settling con-
flicts between disputants – is similar. In fact, criminal
reconciliation does not exclude situations in which pri-
vate persons, semi-official institutions such as the Peo-
ple’s Mediation Committee (PMC), and criminal justice
authorities such as police, prosecutors and judges act as
mediators. Given these considerations, the terms ‘rec-
onciliation’ and ‘mediation’ can be used interchangeably
in this article as long as the mechanism in question satis-
fies the description mentioned previously.
The article consists of six parts including the Introduc-
tion. In the second part, the Confucian-oriented social
norms regarding dispute and dispute resolutions in Chi-
na are examined, with the purpose of exploring the
social and political roots of the popularity of Confucian-
ism. Confucianism doctrines matched the demands of
an agricultural economy and centralised imperial gov-
ernment, and therefore became desirable for the emper-
or. Those doctrines, on the other hand, further shaped
the Chinese aversion to litigation and preference for rec-
onciliation. The third part examines the evolution of law
in terms of criminal reconciliation since the early 1900s.
It also provides a brief introduction to the current crim-
inal reconciliation system. By comparing conventional
social norms and the evolution of law, two waves of
intermediate divergence can be observed. The fourth
part discusses the backgrounds and the actual effect of
legal norms in these two waves and identifies three key
similarities between them. The fifth part examines the
two waves of divergence between law and conventional
social norms regarding criminal reconciliation to better
explain its resurgence in legal norms in the twenty-first
century. Based on this comparison, the final part further
explores the position of criminal reconciliation in
today’s criminal justice system in China.
2 Conventional Social Norms
Regarding Disputes and
Dispute Resolution in China
Before examining the evolution of law on criminal rec-
onciliation as well as its interaction with social norms,
one needs to gain a general understanding of the tradi-
tional Chinese perspectives on dispute and dispute reso-
lution, which are deeply shaped by Confucian doctrines,
especially the concept of ‘harmony’.10 ‘Harmony’, in
Confucian understanding, means ‘an orderly combina-
9. This explanation is based on Black’s Law Dictionary, which is cited and
analysed in Pei (2014), above n. 4, at 193.
10. Scholars have noticed the close connection between the Confucian doc-
trines and the prevalence of mediation in China, although they may dis-
agree on the extent to which such doctrines can affect the modernisa-
tion of criminal proceedings. See e.g. Cohen, above n. 2; B. Goh, Law
without Lawyers, Justice without Courts: On Traditional Chinese
Mediation (2002); Zeng, above n. 2. According to Julia Ching, ‘harmo-
ny’ is actually a key concept for all religions in China, and Confucianism
is just one of them. See J. Ching, Chinese Religions (1993), at 6.
tion of different elements, by which a new unity comes
into being’.11 This new unity brings a state of peace and
stability to the relationships between human beings and
nature, between different hierarchies of society and
between individuals.12 In this sense, a harmonious soci-
ety does not eliminate controversies but instead main-
tains them to a manageable extent and solves them in
effective ways; evaluation of the effectiveness of these
measures is more oriented towards collectivism rather
than individualism.
The popularity of ‘harmonious society’ in China has
deep political, economic and cultural roots. As Robert
Ellickson once commented, ‘[m]embers of tight social
groups … informally encourage each other to engage in
cooperative behavior’.13 The agricultural economy in
ancient China led to appropriately stable and tight social
units such as villages and clans, featuring close interper-
sonal connections and favouring tranquil, self-sufficient,
peaceful and stable (安、足、静、定) social relation-
ships.14 Traditionally, Chinese viewed disputes and liti-
gation as impeding on such social relationships, which
would in turn undermine agricultural production as well
as the commonwealth in general – ‘the more frequent
the litigation is, the more barren the field is; the more
barren the field is, the more empty the barn is; the more
empty the barn is, the poorer the nation is’.15 After
Dong Zhongshu’s development of Neo-Confucianism
during the Western Han Dynasty, these understandings
of harmony were transformed into the concept that
‘humans and Heaven are of one species’ (天人合一).16
Human behaviour, either good or evil, would in this
context arouse a corresponding response from Heaven,
and thus there is a moral demand that individuals culti-
vate their virtues and conscientiously maintain a harmo-
nious relationship with others.
However, the maintenance of a stable and tranquil social
order was not an easy task for the ancient Chinese gov-
ernment. Following the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.),
China gradually developed into a unified state with a
vast territory, complex terrain and diverse ethnic
groups, which, as Weber commented, led to challenges
in maintaining social control:
The paucity of imperial administration actually
meant that the Chinese in town and country ‘gov-
erned themselves’…. During the Middle Ages the
Chinese administration repeatedly sought to shift to
liturgical ways of providing for public needs…. Like
all far flung patrimonial states with undeveloped
techniques of communication the scope of adminis-
11. Gardner, above n. 8, at 171.
12. See X. Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (2000).
13. Ellickson, above n. 1, at 167.
14. M. Qian, 中国文化史导论 (Introduction to the History of Chinese Cul-
ture) (2001), at 4.
15. The original expression is ‘讼狱繁则田荒，田荒则府仓虚，府仓虚则国贫’.
See 韩非子·解老 (Hanfeizi: Explaining Laocius).
16. Y. Su, 春秋繁露义证 (Interpretations on Chunqiu Fanlu) (1992), at 341.
For Dong Zhongshu’s reform of Confucianism, see M. Loewe, Dong
Zhongshu: A ‘Confucian’ Heritage and the Chunqiu Fanlu (2011).
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trative centralization characteristically remained very
limited.17
These geographical characteristics created tension
between central and local governing bodies regarding
power distribution. It further urged the emperor to find
alternative ways to keep the nation together and to
resolve the destabilising factors in the country. Under
the influence of Confucianism, patrimonialism18 and the
traditional clan acted as buffer layers as well as an agen-
cy between the governor and the governed.19 By empha-
sising harmonious relationships in the family and in
local communities, the imperial government centralised
state power by decentralising its administration.
Given these factors, traditional Chinese society general-
ly discouraged direct confrontation between disputants,
especially in the form of formal litigation – a litigation-
averse (厌讼) attitude.20 This is reflected in Confucius’
statement that ‘in hearing litigations, I am like any other
body. What is necessary, however, is to cause the people
to have no litigations’.21 Influenced by this attitude,
local governments adopted low litigation rates as a key
index of good governance, on the one hand, while deem-
ing litigation and its associated disputants to be dis-
graceful, on the other.22
In this context, private and informal victim-offender
reconciliation gradually developed into one of the major
dispute resolution methods, which was praised and pro-
moted by both the government and its citizens.23 Local
self-government organisations, such as the three noble
elders (三老) in the Han Dynasty (202-220 B.C.), the
Li-jia elders (里甲老人 ) in the Ming Dynasty
(1368-1644) and self-governance based on rural agree-
ment (乡约自治) in the Qing Dynasty (1636-1911),24
were developed to mediate disputes in the village or clan
insofar as the fundamental interests of state or imperial
power were not undermined. Except for extremely seri-
ous crimes such as homicide and treason, the question
of whether to submit a dispute to local government
depended on the disputants’ decisions. After a case
17. Weber, above n. 7, at 16.
18. Here the term ‘patrimonialism’ is used in Weber’s version, which refers
to a traditional domination centred on top-down family structures,
especially on the authority of fathers within families.
19. B. Liang, The Changing Chinese Legal System, 1978-Present (2008), at
69-70.
20. See T. Zhang, ‘Why the Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning
over Litigation’, 3 Sociological Study 139 (2009). In this article, the
author explained the relationship between the Confucian doctrines and
how such a relationship influences people’s choice in solving disputes in
China.
21. The original expression is ‘听讼，吾犹人也。必也使无讼乎’. See 论语
·颜渊 (The Analects of Confucius –Yan Yuan).
22. See Q. He, ‘泛讼与厌讼的历时考察：关于中西方法律传统的一点思考
(Historical Review on Pro-Litigation and Anti-Litigation: Comparison
between Western and Chinese Legal Traditions)’, 3 法律科学 (Legal
Science) 10 (1993).
23. See L. Ge, ‘中国古代刑事和解探析 (Exploration of Criminal Reconcilia-
tion in Ancient China)’, 1 刑事司法论坛 (Criminal Justice Forum) 145
(2008).
24. X. Wu, ‘不可回避的存在：解读中国古代社会刑事和解 (An Inevitable
Existence: On the Criminal Reconciliation in Ancient China)’, 3 政法论
坛 (Tribune of Political Science and Law) 39, at 39 (2008).
entered into formal procedure, local officials would nor-
mally refrain from either mediating the case directly or
banning private reconciliation. It was therefore common
for cases to end without adjudication, even though they
had entered the official litigation process.25
3 Evolution of Law on Criminal
Reconciliation Since the Late
Qing Dynasty
Today’s criminal justice system in China can be traced
back to the legal reforms of the late Qing Dynasty,
which directly led to transitions in the mode of criminal
litigation.26 By referring to the experience of foreign
legal systems, Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang, the lead-
ing reformers at that time, drafted the first modern
criminal procedure code (大清刑事民事诉讼律草案)
in 1905.27 Combined with other implementing docu-
ments, especially the Formulation of Adjudication Sys-
tem in Daliyuan (大理院审判编制法) of 1906 and the
Experimental Regulations for Adjudicates below Higher
Courts (高等以下各级审判庭试办章程) of 1907, the
1905 draft established a state monopoly on solving crim-
inal disputes. Crimes, minor or serious, were no longer
regarded as private disputes, and private victim-offend-
er reconciliation was explicitly banned in public prose-
cution cases.28
Before the emperor could validate the draft, the Qing
Dynasty was overthrown by uprisings across the coun-
try.29 China entered the Republican period (1912-1949)
under the leadership of the Kuomingtang (KMT).
Despite the death of the Dynasty, the essence of the
1905 draft, as well as the negative attitude towards crim-
inal reconciliation, was inherited by the Criminal Proce-
dure Code of the Republic of China (中华民国刑事
诉讼条例) in 1928 and 1935.30
The trend of foreclosing criminal reconciliation was
reversed, however, with the change of party leadership
in 1949, when today’s People’s Republic of China was
founded. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) showed
a strong preference for mediating disputes during both
the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) and the
Liberation War (1945-1949). For instance, according to
25. See P. Huang, 清代的法律、社会与文化：民法的表达与实践 (The Law,
Society and Culture of Qing Dynasty: Expressions and Practices of Civil
Law) (2001).
26. For a detailed discussion on the history of Late Qing legal reform, see
S. Huan, ‘Shen Jiaben and the Late Qing Legal Reform (1901-1911)’,
30 East Asia 121 (2013); J. Cheng, Chinese Law in Transition: The Late
Ch’ing Law Reform, 1901-1911 (1983).
27. Before this draft, there was a combined draft procedural code for crimi-
nal and civil litigations (大清刑事民事诉讼律草案) in 1905.
28. This draft distinguished between private prosecution and public prose-
cution, and limited the former to petty offences. It also combined crimi-
nal and civil litigations in the same code, though in different chapters.
29. The last Emperor Pu Yi (溥仪) announced his abdication on 12 February
1912.
30. See Z. Xie, 中华民国立法史 (下) (History of Legislation in the Republic
of China, Volume II) (1999).
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the 1943 CCP Regulations on Mediation in Civil and
Criminal Cases in SNG (陕甘宁边区民刑事案件调解
条例, 1943 Regulations), offenders and victims could
reconcile in all criminal cases except those involving
serious crimes and crimes infringing upon public inter-
ests.31 The 1943 Regulations were revised in 1946, and
because of the risks of corruption and abuse of judicial
power, criminal reconciliation was restricted to cases
that ‘involve slight injuries due to rush impulse or negli-
gence when the public has no objection to reconcilia-
tion’.32 After 1949, the new government followed the
old practice in solving disputes, and the 1954 General
Rules on PMC (人民调解委员会暂行组织通则, 1954
PMC Rules) explicitly approved mediation in minor
criminal cases (Art. 3).33
From 1966 to 1976, the entire legal system was in para-
lysis because of the Cultural Revolution. The atrocities
against human rights during that period warned suc-
ceeding governments about the arbitrariness of the rule
of human and encouraged them to promote the authori-
ty of law.34 The government started formalisation and
professionalisation in the criminal justice system,
accepting concepts such as ‘rule of law’, ‘protection of
human rights’ and ‘judicial independence’.35 Pursuant
to this trend, the 1954 PMC Rules were revised in 1989
to remove the PMC’s authority to mediate minor crimi-
nal cases.36 The reform moved even further in the 1996
revisions to the CPL (1996 CPL) that once again elimi-
nated criminal reconciliation from all public prosecution
cases.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, criminal
reconciliation began to resurge.37 The movement began
with local judicial institutions and then gradually
obtained support from the central government.38 In
2007, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) issued
Several Opinions on the Application of the Criminal
Policy of Tempering Justice with Mercy in Prosecution
31. Art. 2 of the 1943 Regulations stipulated that crimes such as ‘against
the internal security of the State, treason, homicide, banditry, extortion,
violation of governmental regulation, disruption of public order, corrup-
tion, obstructing an officer in the discharge of duties, interference with
voting, and escape’ could not be reconciled.
32. See G. Tang, ‘陕甘宁边区人民调解制度述论 (Comments on People’s
Mediation in SGN)’, 4 甘肃政法学院学报 (Journal of Gansu Political
Science and Law Institute) 51 (1993).
33. Art. 3 stipulated ‘the task of the Committee is to reconcile general civil
disputes and slight criminal offences, and to promote legal promulga-
tion and education through mediation’.
34. For the history of the Cultural Revolution and its relationship with Chi-
na’s modernisation, see T.B. Gold, ‘After Comradeship: Personal Rela-
tions in China since the Cultural Revolution’, 104 The China Quarterly
657 (1985).
35. Regarding China’s judicial reforms related to the rule of law, see R.
Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (2002); A. Dicks,
‘The Chinese Legal System: Reforms in the Balance’, 119 The China
Quarterly 540 (1989).
36. See 人民调解委员会组织条例 (Organic Regulations on People’s Media-
tion Committee), issued and validated on 5 May 1989. Hereinafter the
1989 PMC Regulations.
37. This is a trend that has emerged not only in the criminal justice system
but also in the entire legal system in China. For a detailed analysis on
this topic, see C.F. Minzner, ‘China’s Turn against Law’, 59 The Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law 935 (2011).
38. For the resurging process, see Pei (2014), above n. 4.
(关于在检察工作中贯彻宽严相济司法政策的若干
意见, 2007 SPP Opinions), requiring local people’s pro-
curatorates to ‘improve research on criminal reconcilia-
tion’. Simultaneously, the third Five-Years’ Outline for
Reform of the People’s Court (人民法院第三个五年
改革纲要, 2009-2013) of the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC) listed criminal reconciliation as a major reform.39
Through all these efforts, in 2012, criminal reconcilia-
tion was legitimised by the 2012 CPL as an officially
acknowledged form of dispute resolution.40
The current legal regime concerning criminal reconcili-
ation is mainly regulated by Articles 277-279 of the 2012
CPL.41 According to these Articles, offenders and vic-
tims can reconcile their disputes in two types of cases.
The first type refers to cases that satisfy the following
three conditions: (1) the case must be caused by disputes
among civilians (民间纠纷); (2) it must be concerned to
a crime stipulated by Chapters 4 and 5 of the 1997 CL42
and (3) it should carry a maximum sentence lower than
three years’ imprisonment. The second type refers to
negligent crimes with a maximum sentence lower than
seven years’ imprisonment, except for duty-related
crimes. Offenders who had been convicted of intention-
al crimes within five years prior to the current convic-
tion are disqualified.
For the qualified cases, a reconciliation agreement can
be reached if the offender (1) shows sincere remorse for
the crimes and (2) receives the forgiveness of the victim
by means of compensation, apology or other measures
(Art. 277). After reconciliation, disputants are normally
required to provide a written agreement wherein the
offender expresses remorse and agrees to compensation,
and the victim agrees explicitly with the criminal justice
39. 人民法院第三个五年改革纲要 (2009-2013) (The Third Five-Years’ Out-
line for Reform of the People’s Court), 法发 [2009] 14号 (Fafa [2009]
No.14), issued on 23 February 2009, available at: <http:// news.
xinhuanet. com/ legal/ 2009 -03/ 26/ content_ 11074127. htm> (last visited
28 August 2014).
40. In the 2012 CPL, there are four special procedures described in part 5
(‘Special Procedures’): procedures for juvenile crime; procedures for rec-
onciliation between parties in public prosecution cases; procedures for
the confiscation of illegal earnings in cases where the suspect or
defendant has absconded or died; and compulsory medical procedures
for mentally ill persons legally exempted from criminal liability.
41. For a more detailed introduction of criminal reconciliation in the current
criminal proceedings, see ‘Restoration Agreement’ in Chapter III, in W.
Pei, Criminal Procedural Agreements in China and England and Wales
(2015), at 84-110.
42. Chapter 4 of the 1997 CL regulates crimes infringing personal rights
and citizens’ democratic rights, and Chapter 5 pertains to crimes
encroaching on property. Most crimes stipulated in these two chapters
do not violate social or collective benefits directly, where victims are the
major group who suffer from these crimes.
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authorities’ lenient decisions.43 Based on that agree-
ment, the police can suggest that the public prosecutor
treats the suspect with leniency, the public prosecutor
can either drop charges for extremely minor offences or
make a sentence proposal to the court, and the court can
impose lenient sanctions on the defendant (Art. 278).
4 Two Waves of Marginalising
Criminal Reconciliation in
Law
By examining the development of law on criminal rec-
onciliation since the late Qing Dynasty, it can be
observed that despite the traditional culture of promot-
ing reconciliation and discouraging litigation, the legis-
lator’s attitude towards criminal reconciliation was not
consistent. The analysis previously mentioned shows
that convergence and divergence between law and con-
ventional social norms proceeded alternately and that
there were at least two waves of marginalisation of crim-
inal reconciliation with respect to legal norms: one last-
ing from the late Qing Dynasty to 1949 and the other
lasting from the Cultural Revolution to just before the
beginning of the twenty-first century.
4.1 First Wave Since the Late Qing Dynasty
As part of the process of reforming the entire legal sys-
tem in China, the first wave of marginalising criminal
reconciliation was carried out in the context of a vast
decline and fall of the state. From the domestic perspec-
tive, along with the onset of local rebellions such as the
Taiping Rebellion (太平天国运动, 1851-1864)44 and
the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 (义和团运动),45 the central
government’s control over society was continually
impaired. On the international level, China’s defeat in a
series of wars with Western nations46 provoked a
43. This requirement is not in the 2012 CPL but in the interpretations or
detailed regulations issued by the SPC, SPP and Ministry of Public
Security: Art. 326 of 公安机关办理刑事案件程序规定 (Procedural Reg-
ulations for Public Security Organs on Solving Criminal Cases, the 2012
MPS Regulations), 公安部令第 127号 (Gonganbu Ling No. 127), issued
on 3 December 2012 and validated on 1 January 2013; Art. 516 of 人
民检察院刑事诉讼规则 (试行) (Regulations for People’s Procuratorate
on Criminal Procedure [Trial Implementation], the 2012 SPP Regula-
tions), 检释 [2012] 第 2号 (Jianshi [2012] No. 2), issued on 22 Novem-
ber 2012 and validated on 1 January 2013; Art. 501 of 最高人民法院
关于适用《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》的解释 (SPC’s Interpretation of
Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Criminal Proce-
dure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2012 SPC Interpretations),
法释 [2012] 第 21 号 (Fashi [2012] No. 21), issued on 20 December
2012 and validated on 1 January 2013.
44. For the social backgrounds of the Rebellion, see T. Reilly, The Taiping
Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire (2004).
45. See L. Bodin and C. Warner, The Boxer Rebellion (1979).
46. The main wars include the First Opium War of 1840-1842, the Second
Opium War of 1857-1860, the Russia’s Invasion in 1871, the Sino-Jap-
anese War of 1894-1895 and the allied forces seizure of Peking in
1900.
‘scramble for concessions’ within China’s territory, sig-
nificantly undermining state sovereignty.47
Against such backgrounds and with the purpose of the
Dynasty’s salvation, an intellectual ferment48 began to
take shape, generating a movement for political and
institutional reform that commenced at the end of
1890s.49 On 29 January 1901, the Guangxu Emperor
issued an edict blaming the decline of the Dynasty on
the suffocating constraints of convention and rigid regu-
lations.50 By referring to the experiences of other legal
systems, especially those of Japan,51 the edict further
concluded that, to revive the Dynasty, it was necessary
to learn from Western experience to remove those con-
straints.52
From a more pragmatic perspective, transplanting for-
eign criminal justice rules at that time was directly moti-
vated by the aim of preserving the integrity of state
jurisdiction, especially over foreign-related cases. Since
China’s defeat in the 1840s, foreign invaders began to
deny China’s jurisdiction over foreign-related cases
through unequal treaties. A typical example was the
establishment of the Mixed Court (会审公廨) in 1868
in Shanghai.53 In the 1905 memorial to the Throne,
Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang also mentioned the phe-
nomenon in which foreigners frequently denied China’s
jurisdiction by complaining about its decivilisation, such
as heavy and cruel sanctions, over-broad discretion and
arbitrariness.54 With foreign military forces as backup,
this rejection of jurisdiction paralysed the enforcement
of law. Transplanting foreign laws would to some extent
avoid such excuses.55
47. See S. Jones, ‘Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion’, in J. Fair-
bank (ed.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10 (1978) 107.
48. ‘Intellectual ferment’ refers to intellectual preparation and breeding of
social events. See, for instance, M. Huang, ‘Intellectual Ferment for
Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973’, 51 Pacific Affairs 122 (1978).
49. About the Hundred Days reform movement, which was the climax of
the ferment, see K. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World,: K’ang
Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (1975); L. Kwong, A Mosa-
ic of the Hundred Days (1984).
50. The original expression is ‘我中国之弱，在于习气太深，文法太密’. See
The First Historical Archives of China, 光绪朝上谕档，第二十六册
(Archives of Edicts issued by Guangxu Emperor, Volume 26) (1996), at
460-2.
51. For a long history, Japan had been a tributary to China. After the insti-
tutional, political and technological changes in the Meiji Reform of
1868, however, Japan greatly increased its national strength and defea-
ted China in the first Sino-Japanese War, which was appalling to the
Qing government. In the following years, legal reformers in China star-
ted to explore the reasons behind Japan’s success as well as their adapt-
ability to China. See J. Yang, 清末变法与日本 (Late Qing Legal Reform
and Japan) (2010).
52. The First Historical Archives of China, above n. 50, at 460-2.
53. The Mixed Court, which consisted of Chinese and foreign adjudicators,
had special jurisdiction over civil or criminal cases happened in the
Shanghai concession or those involving foreigners. The Court was abol-
ished in 1927. For an introduction of the Mixed Court and discussion on
its erosion of China’s sovereignty, see Y. Gan, ‘上海会审公廨之研究
(Research on the Shanghai Mixed Court)’, (first published on Taiping
Newspaper (太平导报) in May 1926), in Q. He and X. Li (eds.), 民国
法学论文精粹：诉讼法律篇 (Selected Archives of Legal Studies in the
Republican Period: The Volume of Procedure Law) (2004) 179.
54. H. Gao (ed.), 《大清新刑律》立法资料汇编 (Archives of Legislative
Materials of the Criminal Code of the Qing Dynasty) (2013), at 6.
55. Ibid.
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In sum, the ban on informal and private reconciliation
in criminal cases at that time was supported by three
major fulcrums. First, it followed the Western model of
criminal justice, featuring a state monopoly on penal
power and the rejection of private negotiability. Second,
it restated the state’s sovereignty over all criminal dis-
putes that occurred within its territory, which naturally
included foreign-related cases. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, it reflected the ruling class’ retrospection on the
‘family-state’ model of governance and the attempt to
reinforce power centralisation by removing the agency
of conventional social control, the patriarchal clan sys-
tem.
Despite these three fulcrums, however, studies have
shown that this reform had a very limited impact on
actual practice. In their research on the judicial archives
in Longquan County (龙泉县) from 1929 to 1949, for
instance, Hu Ming and Zhang Jian noticed that criminal
reconciliation still constituted a fairly large proportion
of criminal justice practice.56 According to the study,
the County preserved the files concerning 245 criminal
cases, among which 102 cases were reconciled, a propor-
tion of 41.6%.57 The modern legal system imported
during this period was similar to ‘oil floating on the
water’,58 and, in Muhlhahn’s words, ‘the Republic still
had to accommodate Qing criminal law and the tradi-
tional values that remained in place especially in rural
areas’.59
4.2 Second Wave after the Cultural Revolution
The second wave of divergence between law and con-
ventional social norms on criminal dispute resolution
happened in the late 1970s after the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Ten years of social upheavals had resulted in pro-
found consequences. The first consequence was confu-
sion in both social norms and law. On the one hand, by
attacking traditional Chinese culture, especially in the
‘Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius’ campaign (批林
批孔),60 the Revolution seriously challenged the Confu-
cian-oriented social order. On the other hand, the legis-
56. See M. Hu and J. Zhang, ‘转型与承续：民国时期的刑事和解 (Transfor-
mation and Inheritance: The Criminal Mediation in the Period of the
Republic of China)’, 4 浙江大学学报 (Journal of Zhejiang University)
1(2013).
57. Ibid., at 3.
58. D. Pan, ‘中国近代以来法律文化发展考察 (Study on the Legal Cultural
Development Since 1840 in China)’, 2 社会学研究 (Sociological Stud-
ies) 116 (1989). See also, Zeng, above n. 2.
59. Ibid., at 59.
60. Mao launched the campaign in 1973 after the 1st Plenary Session of
the 10th CCP Central Committee, encouraging public criticism against
Confucius and Confucianism and using Marxism and Maoism as
replacement. This campaign did not directly target at the conventional
Confucianism or Confucius himself, but at Lin Biao (林彪) and Zhou
Enlai (周恩来) by innuendo and insinuation. Even so, it still led to a
social movement against traditional social morals, calling for the abol-
ishment of Confucianism doctrines. In this movement, ‘social harmony’
was replaced by confrontation between man and god, and between
individuals. See A. Gregor and M. Chang, ‘Anti-Confucianism: Mao’s
Last Campaign’, 19 Asian Survey 1073 (1979); K. Forster, ‘The Politics
of Destabilization and Confrontation: The Campaign against Lin Biao
and Confucius in Zhejiang Province, 1974’, 107 China Quarterly 433
(1986).
lative process that had been initiated in 1950s was inter-
rupted, leading to a land without law for a decade.
The second consequence was a power vacuum. Under
slogans such as ‘sweep away all cow-demons and snake-
spirits’ (横扫一切牛鬼蛇神)61 and ‘smash public secur-
ity organs, procuratorates and courts’ (砸烂公检法),62
state functionaries were generally paralysed, and the
central government’s control over society relied heavily
on Mao’s personality and charisma.63 Such control, as
Weber commented, ‘is naturally unstable’.64 This back-
bone of the CCP’s authority during the Revolution col-
lapsed with Mao’s death in 1976, and the new govern-
ment, which was under the leadership of Deng Xiaop-
ing, was confronted with the urgent task of finding a
replacement to restore the legitimacy of the Party.
What could serve as a proper replacement? According to
Weber, the fall of charismatic authority will lead to the
inevitable routinisation through either traditionalisation
or rationalisation, or both.65 Which to choose largely
depends on the social, political and economic back-
grounds at a given time. The establishment of a tradi-
tional authority normally requires bases such as ‘habitu-
ation, respect for tradition, piety toward parents and
ancestors, and the servant’s personal faithfulness’,66
which during the Cultural Revolution was seriously
undermined. Instead of exploring China’s legal tradi-
tions, the government under Deng’s leadership sought
other options, which can be observed from a series of
speeches delivered by Deng. For instance, in his speech
on 28 June 1979, Deng blamed societal turmoil during
the Cultural Revolution on the absence of democracy
and of a legal system.67 In a 1980 speech, he further
argued that this absence, as well as frustrations suffered
61. ‘Cow-demons and snake-spirits’ at first referred to ‘bourgeois experts,
scholars, and academic authorities’, and later it was expanded to Chi-
nese intellectuals and ‘those in power’. See ‘Sweep Away All Cow-
Demons and Snake-Spirits’ in J. Guo, S. Yongyi & Z. Yuan, Historical
Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (2006), at 272.
62. As imported from foreign legal systems, in the Cultural Revolution the
judicial system was claimed to be ‘those in power who take the capital-
ist road’ (走资本主义的当权派), and therefore became the target of the
class struggle. See X. Yang, ‘砸烂公检法和清理阶级队伍 (Smash Public
Security Organs, Procuratorates and Courts, and Rectify the Class
Ranks)’, 2 炎黄春秋 (China’s History) 55 (2013).
63. See J. Andreas, ‘The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case
Study of Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution’, 72 Ameri-
can Sociological Review 434 (2007). Some, however, argued that
Mao’s charismatic leadership had limited impact on people’s behaviour.
Instead of being ‘true believers’, most participants at that time were
actually motivated by calculations of risks and rewards. See G. Wang,
Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan (1995).
64. M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology,
edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, translated by a number of scholars
(1978), at 1114.
65. Ibid. Charismatic authority, legal (or rational) authority and traditional
(or coercive) authority are Max Weber’s tripartite classification of
authority, emphasising the source of legitimacy of the authority. See
T. Waters and D. Waters (eds. and trans.), Weber’s Rationalism and
Modern Society (2015), at 59-72.
66. See above n. 64, at 1118.
67. D. Xiaoping, ‘民主和法制两手都不能削弱 (Strengthen Democracy and
Legal System Simultaneously)’, in CCP Editorial Committee on Party Lit-
erature, 邓小平文选 (第二卷) (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol-
ume 2) (1994), at 189.
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during the history of the CCP, had mainly resulted from
ingrained but outdated patriarchalism.68
This preference for rationalisation was particularly rele-
vant to the third consequence of the Revolution – that is
a wide-spread re-evaluation of human rights protection.
It is easy to ascertain the features of Chinese society
during the Revolution by referring to keywords in the
relevant literatures: ‘turmoil’,69 ‘tumult’,70 ‘purge and
holocaust’71 and so on. In the field of criminal justice,
the principle of nulla poena sine lege did not apply. Tor-
ture and private sanctions were allowed or even applau-
ded; court trials were replaced by violent and humiliat-
ing ‘struggle sessions’; and conviction and sentencing
were decided without any procedure.72
Taken together, these consequences gave birth to the
1979 CPL, which served two major purposes. As a
product of rationalisation, its first function was to
rebuild the state authority by emphasising the monopoly
power of the judicial system in solving criminal cases.
Its second function was to protect people (人民) by
avoiding the misuse of criminal sanctions.73 With
respect to the first function, private settlement was
deemed to infringe upon the judicial system’s monopoly
and create extra-legal exceptions. With respect to the
second, criminal reconciliation was viewed as ideologi-
cally improper, as what was involved in criminal justice
were ‘contradictions between ourselves and the enemy’
(敌我矛盾). The 1996 CPL inherited the structure and
the guiding ideology of the 1979 CPL, with its revisions
mainly focused on refining old rules and strengthening
human rights protections.
What about dispute resolution in practice? In the 1980s
and the 1990s, mediation or reconciliation rarely
appeared in criminal law studies. However, the work of
both Fei Xiaotong and Su Li has shown people’s confu-
sion regarding formal dispute resolution in rural areas.74
Local legal officials were also occasionally consulted by
disputants about the possibility of solving criminal cases
68. See D. Xiaoping, ‘党和国家领导制度的改革 (Reforms on CCP and State
Leadership)’, in ibid., at 320.
69. See R. King, S.T. Zheng & S. Watson (eds.), Art in Turmoil: The Chinese
Cultural Revolution (1966-76) (2010).
70. See J. Daubier, A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1974).
71. See M. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution Reconsidered:
Beyond Purge and Holocaust (2003).
72. These features are well presented by Gao Yuan’s book, in that the
author recorded some cases in detail with respect to the arbitrary use of
violence. See Y. Gao, Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution
(1987).
73. See G. Wang, ‘一部社会主义的刑事诉讼法典 (A Criminal Procedure
Code of Socialism)’, 4 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University) 10
(1979).
74. See X. Fei, 乡土中国 (Rural China) (2008); L. Su, 送法下乡：中国基层司
法制度研究 (Deliver Knowledge of Law to the Rural Areas: Research on
the Legal System of China at the Basic Level) (2000). One should be
aware of the importance of studying legal enforcement in these rural
areas in China. According to World Bank’s statistics, the proportion of
rural population in China was around 70% in the 1990s and 50%-60%
in the 2000s. Last year, the rate was still as high as 47%. Given such a
large population, the quality of legal enforcement among them is
directly and significantly influential to that of the entire legal system.
Statistics are available at: <http:// data. worldbank. org/ indicator/ SP. RUR.
TOTL. ZS> (last visited 12 November 2015).
privately.75 Since the 2000s, studies on criminal reconci-
liation have gradually increased, and their focus has
shifted from rural areas to cities.76 For instance, from
2006 to 2008, Song Yinghui conducted systematic
empirical research on criminal reconciliation in seven
district people’s procuratorates in four large cities, and
the reconciliation rate varied between 0.5% and 4.4%.77
These studies show that criminal reconciliation is not
applied on a massive scale.
4.3 Comparison between Two Waves of Legal
Norms and Social Norms’ Divergence
At first glance, the two waves of divergence between law
and conventional social norms are distinguished in sev-
eral aspects, such as direct motivations (opposition to
foreign invaders vs. restoration of domestic order), the
dominant ideology of the government (imperialism vs.
communism), the social class supporting reform (intel-
lectual elite vs. grassroots and intellectual elite) and the
subsequent social environment (war vs. peace). These
distinctions, although crucial to interpreting reform
strategies and tactics in detail, can explain neither the
fundamental reasons behind the divergence that is com-
mon to both the two waves nor the consequences of
such divergence, especially the enforceability of law. In
addition, they are of little help in understanding the
resurgence of criminal reconciliation in the 2012 CPL.
A more contributive perspective is therefore required to
find similarities in the midst of such differences.
At first, it is not difficult to notice that both waves of
divergence occurred during times of social turbulence
when serious challenges were being mounted to state
authority. At those times, it was urgent for the govern-
ment to re-establish its legitimacy, to centralise state
power and, based on that, to restore social order.
Against this background, a common and pragmatic
approach adopted by the late Qing government and the
75. See e.g. Cangshan People’s Procuratorate, ‘重伤案件能否调解 (Can
Assault Cases that Resulted in Serious Injury Be Mediated?)’, 1 中国
民营 (China Non-Governmental) 53 (1999); W. Lu, ‘已调解赔偿的刑事
案件可追究行为人的刑事责任 (Suspects Can Be Prosecuted Regardless
of Mediation and Compensation)’, 3 法学杂志 (Law Science Magazine)
29 (1996).
76. See W. Fu, ‘刑事和解的实证分析 (Empirical Research on Criminal Rec-
onciliation)’, 14 国家检察官学院学报 (Journal of National Prosecutors
College) 60 (2006) (research in Yuhua District People’s Procuratorate in
Hebei Province); L. Wang and Y. Li, ‘刑事和解工作机制实证研究
(Empirical Research on the Working Mechanism of Criminal Reconcilia-
tion)’, 26 政法论坛 (Tribune of Political Science and Law) 22 (2008)
(research on the satisfaction rate of disputants in Chaoyang People’s
Procuratorate in Beijing); C. Fan and J. Ai, ‘刑事和解管见和实证考量
(Opinions and Empirical Examination on Criminal Reconciliation)’, 2
中国司法 (Justice of China) 24 (2010) (research in Haidian District Peo-
ple’s Court in Beijing); Y. Zhang et al, ‘刑事和解中检察机关能共司法的
制度选择 (Legal Regime on Criminal Reconciliation for People’s Procu-
ratorate under Active Judicature)’, 11 政治与法律 (Political Science and
Law) 155 (2010) (research in six district people’s procuratorates in
Shanghai); Y. Zhang and X. Lu, ‘公安部门刑事和解体系实证研究
(Research on Criminal Reconciliation in Public Security Organs)’, 26
江苏警官学院学报  (Journal of Jiangsu Police Office College) 140
(2011) (research in local PSO in Jiangsu).
77. See Y. Song, ‘我国刑事和解实证分析 (Empirical Research on Criminal
Reconciliation in China)’, 5 中国法学  (China Legal Sciences) 123
(2008). The rate is consistent with that obtained by the author in her
interviews with local legal officials. See Pei (2014), above n. 4.
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CCP was to remove agency in the administration of
power by ‘strengthening and institutionalizing mecha-
nisms of administrative and organizational controls’.78
Criminal and penal laws in this context were used by the
state to ‘define and enforce a new set of state-sponsored
social values’ and, hopefully, to ‘guard and enhance its
authority’.79 Criminal reconciliation, which traditionally
induced the administration of penal power of the state
apparatus in a decentralised way, was undesirable.
How, then, can a proper substitution be found? Answers
to this question reveal the second similarity between the
two waves: the legal reforms in China during the two
periods were not self-generated but consisted mainly of
legal transplants.80 However, legal transplants in both
periods were implemented within a short period of time
and in the context of socio-political chaos. With regard
to legal transplants in the first wave, Ng commented
that ‘although the government was the main driver of
legal reform, government heads may not have accurately
perceived the outcomes of that reform’.81 The social
unrest in the following period further frustrated the sys-
tematic establishment of the corresponding state appara-
tus. More importantly, it impeded the internalisation
process of new values among members of society. These
observations are also true of the second wave, which can
be better illustrated by the aforementioned gap between
the legal rules and its actual effects regarding criminal
reconciliation.
More importantly, when both legal reforms took place,
the Chinese economic pattern and the corresponding
social structure had not yet experienced a fundamental
transition. This is the third similarity. Before the first
wave in the 1900s, ‘there was little of the Chinese econ-
omy … that was not included within the agricultural
sector or quite intimately connected with it’.82 In the
Late Qing Dynasty, reformists such as Kang Youwei
had proposed modernisation in industry, commerce,
transportation and communication, the fiscal system
and so on.83 These economic measures, although orien-
ted in the right direction, failed to adapt to China’s spe-
cial environment and, consequently, to fundamentally
reform the agricultural economy and the corresponding
social relationship.84
78. P. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist
Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (2008), at 12.
79. K. Muhlhahn, Criminal Justice in China: A History (2009), at 58-59.
80. The first wave was mainly influenced by the Japanese Law. In the sec-
ond wave, the 1979 CPL was a hybrid of several legal traditions. For
one thing, it was in general based on the framework of the 1963 Draft
of CPL that had imported key elements of the former Soviet Union
laws. For another, it also absorbed ingredients of Western laws, espe-
cially those concerning human rights protections. The 1996 CPL did not
change the structure fundamentally but imported strong adversarial
features from common law legal system. For the influence of foreign
laws on the evolution of Chinese criminal procedural rules, see H. Wu
and S. Zhong, 中国刑事诉讼法典百年 (1906年-2012年) (A Century of
China’s Criminal Procedure Codes, 1906-2012) (2012).
81. M. Ng, Legal Transplantation in Early Twentieth-Century China: Prac-
ticing Law in Republican Beijing (1910s-1930s) (2014), at 1.
82. J. Fairbank and K. Liu (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume
II, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, (1980), at 1.
83. See Hsiao, above n. 49.
84. Ibid.
With regard to the second wave, the new government
had, since 1949, launched campaigns to communise or
nationalise the state economy according to the model of
the former Soviet Union. The latter, however, did not
provide concrete and practical guidance on how to con-
struct a communist economy. Therefore, in the 1950s
and the early 1960s, China experienced ‘a bewildering
succession of [economic] reforms’85 such as the Great
Leap Forward (大跃进), which led to a disastrous eco-
nomic recession in the following years.86 With the suc-
cession of the Cultural Revolution, there was also no




in the Twenty-First Century
5.1 What Has Changed and What Has Remained
the Same?
The purpose of examining the two waves of divergence
between law and conventional social norms regarding
criminal reconciliation is to better explain its resurgence
in legal norms in the twenty-first century. To achieve
this, one needs to start by assessing the changes in the
social, economic and political backgrounds in the new
century by comparing them with those during the two
waves of divergence.
Above all, the most dramatic change is the rapid transi-
tion from a planned to a market economy. Under the
slogan ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’(中国特
色的社会主义), policies such as the permissive devel-
opment of private enterprises, the decollectivisation of
the rural commune system, the embrace of foreign
investment, and the privatisation and contracting out of
some state-owned industries were gradually introduced.87
These reforms triggered not only unprecedented eco-
nomic growth but also profound changes in the conven-
tional social structure in the following decades. For
instance, the proportion of rural residents in 1950 in
China was approximately 88.8%. It took forty years for
the state to decrease the rate to 73.6% (in 1990), yet it
took only twenty years for it to further decrease to
50.32% (in 2010).88 From 1979 to 2009, the urban pop-
85. M. Goldman and R. MacFarquhar (eds.), The Paradox of China’s Post-
Mao Reforms (1999), at 3.
86. Bachman described the Great Leap Forward as ‘one of the most
extreme, bizarre, and eventually catastrophic episodes in twentieth-cen-
tury political history’. See D. Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and
Leaderships in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap For-
ward (1991), at 2.
87. See L. Brandt and T. Rawski (eds.), China’s Great Economic Transfor-
mation (2008).
88. For the data before 2006, see Liang, above n. 19, at 102-3. For the
data in 2010, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010年第六次
全国人口普查主要数据公报  (Gazette of Major Data of the Sixth
National Population Census in 2010), issued on 28 April 2011, availa-
ble at: <www. gov. cn/ test/ 2012 -04/ 20/ content_ 2118413. htm> (last
visited 19 November 2015).
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ulation grew by approximately 440 million, which is
described by scholars as ‘the largest [rural-urban migra-
tion] in human history’.89 According to the report of the
National Health and Family Planning Commission of
China (NHFPC), in 2013, the floating population90 has
reached 245 million.91 Such mobility contrasts sharply
with the traditional image of the Chinese – that is of ‘a
non-migratory people’.92 In addition, the one-child poli-
cy has, to some extent, diminished family size and disin-
tegrated traditional clans.93
It was in this context that China launched a new legal
reform in the end of the 1990s.94 All three similarities
between the two waves identified in the previous section
have changed in today’s society. First, after three deca-
des of economic reform, the traditional agricultural
economy has greatly shrunk, along with the convention-
al patriarchal system and close and stable inter-personal
relationships. Secondly, the new reform was motivated
by domestic and spontaneous demand, aimed at guiding
economic growth. Thirdly, the relatively stable social
environment after the 1970s guaranteed a gradual inter-
nalisation of new legal concepts imported along with the
1979 and 1996 CPL – that is judicial independence (in a
relative sense), human rights protection (also relatively)
and rule of law (although this thought is often confused
with that of ‘rule by law’).
With all these changes, emphasising the centralisation of
state power appears to be neither urgent nor directly
beneficial. In fact, the mismatch between the gradually
decentralised state economy and stubbornly centralised
government power has provoked fierce academic
debate.95 As Landry commented, China’s position is
particularly puzzling if we consider the nature of its
political institutions. Decentralization may benefit the
economy, yet … [it] corrodes authoritarianism by creat-
89. K. Chan, ‘China, Internal Migration’, in I. Ness and P. Bellwood (eds.),
The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration (2013) 1.
90. ‘Floating population’, ‘流动人口’ in Chinese, refers to a group of people
who are registered in one region and resided in another region for a
certain period of time, but are not considered as part of the official cen-
sus count in the region of their residence. It is related to China’s resi-
dence permission system.
91. See The Floating Population Division of NHFPC, 中国流动人口发展报告
2014 (Report on China’s Migrant Population Development 2014)
(2014).
92. See R. Skeldon, ‘Migration from China’, 49 Journal of International
Affairs 434 (1996).
93. See S. Greenhalgh, Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng’s China
(2008).
94. The symbol of the new reform was the SPC’s first five-year plan of
reforming people’s courts (人民法院五年改革纲要), 法发 [1999] 28号
(Fafa [1999] No. 28), issued on 20 October 1999.
95. See e.g. Landry, above n. 78; F. Gul and H. Lu, Truths and Half Truths:
China’s Socio-Economic Reforms (1978-2010) (2011); T. Wright,
Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China’s Reform
Era (2010); R. Schiere, China’s Development Challenges: Economic
Vulnerability and Public Sector Reform (2010). The economic prosperi-
ty appears to be exactly a product of mechanical dysfunction or mal-
function of the state apparatuses, giving rise to questions such as ‘does
law matter’. See V. Lo, ‘China’s Path to Development: Does Law Mat-
ter?’ in V. Lo and M. Hiscock, The Rise of the BRICS in the Global
Political Economy (2014) 268; M. Faure and J. Smits, Does Law Mat-
ter? On Law and Economic Growth (2011).
ing loci of power that can gradually develop into a
source of political opposition.96
The most influential wave of decay happened around
the late 1980s, peaking with the Tiananmen Event in
1989.97 This event, on the one hand, led to the govern-
ment’s rather conservative attitude towards Western
ideologies such as democracy,98 whereas, on the other
hand, it ‘destroyed what little belief in Marxism-Lenin-
ism was left’.99
Against such backgrounds, the Chinese government was
confronted in the late 1990s with ideological confusion
in society, which put its legitimacy at stake. When eco-
nomic prosperity continues apace, the risk can remain
implicit and under control. However, when the precon-
dition fails or is challenged, the tension between the
monistic government and society is likely to become
pointed. This is exactly what happened at the beginning
of the twenty-first century when the gross domestic
product (GDP) annual growth rate dropped from
14.3% in 1992 to 7.9% in 1999, and the decrease con-
tinued in the following years.100 Meanwhile, rapid eco-
nomic growth has also caused unexpected problems.
The Gini efficient in China increased from 0.291 in
1981 to 0.392 in 1999.101 In 2014, the rate reached 0.469,
indicating a serious wealth gap in society.102 In addition,
in 2014, China became the second-largest economy in
the world, but its ranking in the Corruption Perceptions
Index issued by Transparency International was only
100.103 The most populous parts of China are exposed
to serious water and air pollutions such as the notorious
PM 2.5.104 Bubbles in housing prices and the unbeara-
ble cost of medical care and education have further
sharpened social contradiction.105 Correspondingly, the
frequency of social protests (群体性事件) has increased
dramatically, some of which even caused serious con-
frontations between local governments and citizens.106
In this context, here again emerges the old question of
how a monistic government can maintain social stability
in such a large territory. With suspicion against Western
ideologies and collapsing communist beliefs, the central
96. Landry, above n. 78, at 6-10.
97. See J. Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition
(2004).
98. See J. Beja (ed.), The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre
(2011).
99. Fewsmith, above n. 97, at 9.
100. See World Bank statistics on GDP annual growth, available at: <http://
data. worldbank. org/ indicator/ NY. GDP. MKTP. KD. ZG/ countries/ CN ?
page= 4& display= default> (last visited 20 November 2015).
101. Data are available at: <http:// data. worldbank. org/ indicator/ SI. POV.
GINI ?page= 1> (last visited 19 November 2015).
102. See NBS, 2014 年国民经济在新常态下平稳运行 (Smooth Running of
National Economy under ‘New Normal’ in 2014), available at: <www.
stats. gov. cn/ tjsj/ zxfb/ 201502/ t20150211_ 682459. html> (last visited
19 November 2015).
103. Data available at: <www. transparency. org/ cpi2014/ results> (last visited
20 November 2015).
104. See World Bank, Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of
Physical Damages, available at: <http:// siteresources. worldbank. org/
INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/ Resources/ China_ Cost_ of_ Pollution.
pdf> (last visited 24 November 2015).
105. See Gul and Lu, above n. 95.
106. Pei (2014), above n. 4, at 215-6.
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government has shifted its emphasis from pure rational-
isation to a combination of rationalisation and tradition-
alisation, the third option offered by Weber.107 During
the past fifteen years, the central government intro-
duced a new political goal of ‘constructing socialist har-
monious society’ (构建社会主义和谐社会), restating
the importance of maintaining harmonious relationships
between individuals, between the government and peo-
ple, between human beings and nature, and between
China and foreign countries.108 Confucianism is propa-
gandised as the essence of China’s culture and an indis-
pensable ingredient of the country’s soft power. On the
international level, a typical symbol of the government’s
promotion of Confucianism is the worldwide spread of
Confucius institutes.109 On the domestic level, the con-
cepts of ‘family’ and ‘neighbourhood’ and traditional
moralities such as filial piety are highlighted in politics
and everyday life.110
5.2 Position of Criminal Reconciliation in
Today’s Chinese Criminal Justice System
The resurgence of criminal reconciliation in the twenty-
first century is by no means a coincidence. The changes
in political ideology are reflected in the operation of the
legal system. All legal institutions, including those in
the criminal justice system, are required to proactively
solve social disputes and promote harmonious inter-per-
sonal relationship.111 The 2012 CPL bears the corre-
sponding task of ‘safeguarding social security, resolving
social conflicts, and maintaining social stability’.112
Criminal reconciliation, which can restore the harmo-
nious relationship between offenders and victims, can
contribute to requirement harmonious society. Behind it
is the government’s attempt to subcontract, although in
a controlled manner and scope, the task of social control
to local legal systems, to family and community, and to
ordinary citizens.
Private dispute resolution has indeed functioned well
over the past thousands of years, but can it still work
today? From the previous discussion, it should be noted
that while the central government is, in Deng’s famous
107. Weber (1978), above n. 64.
108. 中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定 (The Deci-
sion of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues in Con-
structing of an Harmonious Socialist Society), on the 6th Plenary Session
of the 16th Central Committee of CPC, 2006, available at: <http://
news. xinhuanet. com/ politics/ 2006 -10/ 18/ content_ 5218639. htm> (last
visited 16 March 2015).
109. See H. Lai, ‘China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power’, in H. Lai
and Y. Lu (eds.), China’s Soft Power and International Relations
(2012), at 83-103.
110. See D. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a
Changing Society (2010).
111. 中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定 (The Deci-
sion of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues in Con-
structing of an Harmonious Socialist Society), on the 6th Plenary Session
of the 16th Central Committee of CPC, available at: <http:// news.
xinhuanet. com/ politics/ 2006 -10/ 18/ content_ 5218639. htm> (last vis-
ited 16 March 2015).
112. See 关于《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法修正案 (草案) 》说明 (Official
Interpretations on the Draft of the 2012 CPL), issued on 8 March 2012,
available at: <www. gov. cn/ 2012lh/ content_ 2086875. htm> (last visited
25 November 2015).
expression, ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’
(摸着石头过河), the basis of traditional culture is also
in transition. On the one hand, changes in the economic
pattern and social structure mentioned previously have
shaken the roots of Confucian doctrines. On the other
hand, several anti-Confucian trends and the influence of
communism and capitalism since the early 1900s have
caused ideological confusion in society.
In the field of criminal justice, the modernisation pro-
cess has established, especially since the late 1970s, a
primary structure of formalised and professionalised
proceedings. Criminal reconciliation can only be rein-
troduced within this structure as a supplement to ordi-
nary criminal procedure. Taken from this starting point,
several features of the current criminal reconciliation
system can be observed.
First, reconciliation can only be conducted if the over-
arching tasks of criminal procedures are not violated,
that is to convict the guilty, to acquit the innocent and
to assign proper sanctions. This is reflected in the treat-
ment by the 2014 SPC Sentencing Guiding Opinions on
Normal Crimes (关于常见犯罪的量刑指导意见, 2014
Guiding Opinions) of defendants who have reached rec-
onciliation agreements with victims; before any sentence
discount is issued, the baseline for sentencing must be
established according to the seriousness of the crime and
the culpability of the defendant. Normally the discount
should not exceed 50%.113
The second feature concerns the effect of reconciliation.
Under the new legal regime, matters that can be recon-
ciled through informal dispute resolution are explicitly
restricted to issues such as financial compensation.
Accordingly, the offender-victim agreement can only
affect the arrangement of civil rights and obligations,
and criminal law issues such as conviction and sentenc-
ing are strictly reserved to criminal justice agencies.
The effect of reconciliation is largely relevant to the
changing role of victims in the criminal justice system,
which is the third feature. Along with the modernisation
of criminal justice, victims gradually have lost their
dominant role in processing crimes and reconciling with
offenders. In fact, one of the toughest issues in embed-
ding criminal reconciliation in the current criminal jus-
tice system is how to situate victims and to what extent
judicial decisions can be influenced by their voices.
Last but not least, criminal reconciliation under the
2012 CPL normally will not terminate criminal proce-
dure, but will only act as a mitigating factor in legal
decisions. In this way, the law has set restrictions not
only on private disputants but also on criminal justice
authorities.
These features weaken the ability of criminal reconcilia-
tion to absorb and process disputants’ grievances and
result in two phenomena regarding its implementation.
The first one is that the scale of criminal reconciliation
after the promulgation of the 2012 CPL is still relatively
small. For instance, according to Xu Qiming’s empirical
113. In extreme minor crimes, the discount can be higher, or even exemption
of punishment. See Art. 10 of the 2014 Guiding Opinions.
28
ELR August 2016 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000065
research in six district PSOs in Guangdong Province
from January 2012 to April 2013, the reconciliation rate
varied between 5% and 7%.114 It is similar to situations
in the people’s courts. An empirical study of a basic
people’s court (a court at the lowest level) in Beijing
shows that, in 2013, there were only 206 cases recon-
ciled, constituting 6.48% of the entire caseload.115 Rec-
onciliation was mostly applied in cases of traffic offen-
ces, crimes of assault that caused slight injuries, theft,
negligent crimes and some minor economic crimes.116
The second phenomenon is that tension between crimi-
nal reconciliation and ordinary criminal proceedings
provokes suspicion as to the legitimacy of criminal rec-
onciliation. In fact, today’s criminal reconciliation has
been criticised for enabling the rich to ‘buy their way
out’ (花钱买刑).117 Such a critique hardly existed in the
traditional Chinese legal system.
6 Conclusions
Criminal reconciliation in China has deep roots in Con-
fucianism, which was in general the product of ‘an agri-
cultural society’s quest for a comfortable home and a
satisfying enterprise … [and the government’s quest
for] social stability, concord and order’.118 Either abol-
ishing or enabling criminal reconciliation in law is mere-
ly a small part of the government’s strategy to maintain
legitimacy and social stability. However, any rushed
departure from conventional social norms, which nor-
mally occurs during urgent political and social crises, is
likely to undermine the enforceability of law.
In the past few decades, however, the conventional
foundations of Confucianism have been in transition.
On the one hand, its economic basis and corresponding
social structure have changed, with calls for the decen-
tralisation of state power and for democracy. On the
other hand, the unitary political regime in China’s vast
territories remains in existence in the form of a ‘party-
state’. The current position of criminal reconciliation in
the criminal justice system reflects the mismatch
between China’s economic foundation and correspond-
ing social structure. Through this keyhole, one can
observe some fundamental issues in Chinese society. At
114. Q. Xu and X. Kong, ‘公安机关刑事和解实证研究 (Empirical Research on
Criminal Reconciliation in PSOs)’, 2 中国人民公安大学学报 (Journal of
People’s Public Security University of China) 43 (2014).
115. The Criminal Reconciliation Research Group in Chaoyang District Peo-
ple’s Court in Beijing, ‘关于法院适用刑事和解程序的调研报告 (Empiri-
cal Research Report on The Application of Criminal Reconciliation in
People’s Court)’, 11 人民司法 (People’s Judicature) 42 (2014).
116. Ibid., at 46-47.
117. See Y. Zhang, 烟台首例刑事和解案引关注：会导致花钱买刑吗 (The
First Criminal Reconciliation in Yantai City Drew Attention: Will It Lead
to Buying Penalty), 26 March 2013, available at: <http:// qd. ifeng. com/
sd/ detail_ 2013_ 03/ 26/ 661668_ 0. shtml> (last visited 28 August 2014);
专家解读刑事和解：明确使用标准避免花钱买刑 (Experts Comment on
Criminal Reconciliation: Clarify Standards to Avoid Buying Penalty), 27
September 2012, available at: <http:// news. xinhuanet. com/ legal/ 2012
-09/ 27/ c_ 123766919. htm> (last visited 13 August 2014).
118. Zeng, above n. 2.
heart is the question of whether the government can
adapt itself to a changed social and economic environ-
ment without abolishing the monistic political regime.
Reintroducing criminal reconciliation or, more radically,
reintroducing Confucian concepts in today’s China
reflects the government’s attempt to answer that ques-
tion. Is it, however, the right answer? It is difficult to
assess. Even so, the Chinese government needs to be
aware of three things. First, the impact of Confucian
doctrines in society is weakening, and this is likely to
continue in the future. Careful and prudent evaluation
is required to assess the extent to which the government
can continue to rely on these doctrines. Second, political
decentralisation is inevitable, regardless of ownership or
administration. Criminal reconciliation in the current
legal regime can hardly serve the purpose of the central
state power. The strategies of social control adopted by
the government should be in line with, and try to adapt
to, the trend of decentralisation, rather than go against
it. Third, the inconsistent and pragmatic transplant of
foreign legal rules that began in the 1900s has created a
highly fragmented criminal justice system. The mixture
of, on the one hand, domestic and foreign and, on the
other, traditional and modern factors in the interaction
of social norms and legal norms exists not only in crimi-
nal reconciliation but also in the context of other issues.
Without careful and delicate assessment of these factors,
the actual effect of legal reforms may depart from the
original legislative intent.
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